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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Comment on Recent Decisions
BIGAMY-JURISDICTION OF OFFnNSE.-A married man living in Texas
was married in Oklahoma to a second Texas woman. Immediately after
the ceremony the paities returned to Texas and lived openly as husband
and wife. In a prosecution for bigamy defendant was held not guilty un-
der the Texas statute, which reads as follows: "Any person who has a
former wife or husband living who shall marry another in this state shall
be confined to the penitentiary. . ." Hopson v. State (Tex. 1930) 30
S. W. (2d) 311.
At common law, bigamy was an offense of ecclesiastical cognizance only,
but it was early made a felony by statute. 1 Jas. I c. 11 (1603). All
the law of bigamy is therefore statutory. By this early statute the act
of marrying the second time was the offense, and only the courts of the
jurisdiction where this marriage took place could entertain a prosecution
for the offense. 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (9th ed. 1885) 491. Thus
it was possible for a person to have two or more husbands or wives with
perfect security if he took the precaution not to have the ceremony per-
formed in England or Ireland. 1 Hale, P. C., 693; 1 East P. C. 466.
To remedy this situation, Parliament has passed statutes giving juris-
diction to courts in any county where the person is apprehended if he is
a British subject, no matter where the second marriage was performed.
9 Geo. IV c. 31, s. 22 (1829); 24 and 25 Viet. c. 100 (1861). These stat-
utes have been uniformly upheld. Russell's Trial (1901) 1 A. C. 466;
Reg. v. Topping (1856) 7 Cox C. C. 103; Reg. v. Audley (1907) 1 K. B.
383.
Similar statutes in the United States and Canada have been declared
unconstitutional, however, because they are contrary to the provisions in
state constitutions giving defendants the right to a trial in the county
where the crime is committed. Walls v. State (1877) 32 Ark. 565; State
v. Smiley (1889) 98 Mo. 605, 12 S. W. 247; State v. Cutshall (1892) 110
N. C. 538, 15 S. E. 261; Reg. v. Plowman (Can. 1895) 25 Ont. Rep. 656.
Thus the place where the second marriage is performed is still material
where the act of marrying the second time is the crime. Consequently,
the same result would have been reached on the jurisdictional ground in
the principal ease even though the phrase "in this state" had been omit-
ted from the statute.
Many states have overcome the jurisdictional difficulty by creating two
separate offenses by statute: bigamy, in which the act of marrying the
second time is the crime, as before, and cohabitation, usually also called
bigamy, in which living with the second spouse while the first is still
alive is the crime. Brewer v. State (1877) 59 Ala. 101; State v. Stewart
(1906) 194 Mo. 345, 92 S. W. 878; State v. Steupper (1902) 117 Iowa
591, 91 N. W. 912; State v. Durphy (1903) 43 Ore. 79, 71 Pac. 63; Keneval
v. State (1901) 107 Tenn. 581, 64 S. W. 897; People v. Ellis (1928) 204
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Cal. 39, 266 Pac. 518. Texas, however, has no statute of the second type,
and by a proper interpretation of its statute the principal case could not
have been decided otherwise. At least four other states are similarly
deficient in that the cohabitation with a second spouse married outside the
state is not bigamy. Kimser v. Commonwealth (1918) 181 Ky. 727, 205
S. W. 951; State v. Ray (1909) 151 N. C. 710, 66 S. E. 204; McBride v.
Graeber (1915) 16 Ga. App. 240, 85 S. E. 86; State v. Stephens (1919)
118 Me. 237, 107 Atl. 296. H. C. H., '31.
CONFLICT OF LAWs-EFFECT OF RECORD OF CHATTEL MORTGAGE.-A I im-
portant question in the law of chattel mortgages relates to the effect the
recording in one state has when the mortgaged property is removed to
another state. A recent Arizona case holds that "chattel mortgages re-
corded in the state where executed and there conveying constructive no-
tice, continue to have the same effect when property is removed to an-
other state." Davis v. Standard Accident Ins. Co. (Ariz. 1929) 278 Pac.
384. This rule, arbitrarily laid down, would work grave injustice upon
any subsequent purchaser in the state to which the property has been re-
moved.
Many jurisdictions are in accord with the rule announced in the prin-
cipal case. Finance Corp. v. Kelly (Mo. 1921) 235 S. W. 146; In 'e Shan-
nahan & Wrightson Hardware Co. (1922) 2 W. W. Harr. (Del.) 37, 118
Atl. 599; National Bank v. Ripley (1927) 204 Iowa 590, 215 N. W. 647.
Contra are decisions in Pennsylvania, Texas, Michigan and Louisiana
which refuse to recognize chattel mortgages filed in another state. De-
want v. Decan (La. 1930) 128 So. 700; Sherman State Bank v. Carr (1900)
15 Pa. Super. 346; Farmer v. Evans (1921) 111 Tex. Civ. App. 283, 233
S. W. 101; Allison v. Teeters (1913) 176 Mich. 216, 142 N. W. 340. The
former rule would allow the mortgagors of property to remove it from
the state, even with the consent of the mortgagee, and in another state
defraud an innocent third party who would be subject to the original
mortgagee's priority. The latter would impose an undue burden on the
original mortgagee and would place his rights in jeopardy. A more just
rule is one which requires the consenting mortgagee or the mortgagee
with knowledge of the mortgagor's removal of the property to file his
lien in the state into which the property is taken. Moore v. Keystone
Driller Co. (1917) 30 Idaho 220, 163 Pac. 1114; Cable Piano Co. v. Lewis
(1922) 195 Ky. 666, 243 S. W. 924; Adamson v. Fogelstrom (1927) 221
Mo. App. 1243, 300 S. W. 841. Under this rule a mortgagee without knowl-
edge of the removal of the property maintains his priority without so
recording the mortgage. Cable Piano Co. v. Lewis, above; Walters v.
Skinner (C. C. A. 7, 1915) 272 F. 435. J. G. G., '32.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE POWER-REQUIREMENT OF BOND FOR MILK-
GATHERING STATIONS.-A statute required parties desiring to operate
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